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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the links between gambling, moral regulation, and
politics in Canada. The proliferation of online gaming platforms has
resulted in a new wave of gaming expansion, with online casinos and
sports betting growing in market share over traditional land-based
betting. Does Canada’s Criminal Code and supporting regulatory
scheme effectively address the problems posed by online gambling?
This paper examines the origins and history of the gambling provisions
in the Criminal Code and reviews their development over time through
amendments and judicial interpretation. The paper then establishes
how the Criminal Code provisions are applied to bets made over the
internet. Next, it analyzes the legal issues around the Kahnawake
Gaming Commission, an extension of a First Nation’s claim to
sovereignty and the most prolific online gambling regulator in the
world. The paper concludes with ideas about the next steps in gaming
regulation in Canada, suggesting the federal government is better
suited than the provinces to provide and regulate gaming done over
the internet.
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Benjamin Disraeli’s fictional character Lord Roehampton had a saying that
“there is no gambling like politics.”1 Lord Roehampton’s curious idiom touches
on an intimate connection between government and vice. In Canada, that
connection remains stronger than ever. Gambling is part of everyday life and at
its core, is innocent enough – two people disagree about the likely outcome of a
future event, each of whom will profit if the other is wrong. In the episode
“Hurricane Neddy”, The Simpsons character Ned Flanders famously said that
insurance was like gambling: in a nutshell, the insured bets that their car will break
down and require repairs before they’ve paid that value in premiums. In addition
to this tongue-in-cheek and innocent association, gambling is also associated with
alcohol, drugs, and prostitution as a related ‘vice’. At best, gambling is tolerated
as a necessary evil, but many societies take steps to restrict or ban gambling
altogether. In Canada, the Criminal Code has had anti-gambling prohibitions since
it first came into force in 1892, but gambling is now regarded as inevitable, and
as a regulatory rather than criminal problem.
Despite restrictions on gambling in Canada and around the world, global
gambling revenue is expected to surpass $600 billion USD by 2022.2 Online
gaming accounts for a significant portion of that growing pie. In 2014, the market
for online gaming was estimated at $35.97 billion USD and is expected to climb
to $66.59 billion USD by 2020.3 The Criminal Code provisions on gambling haven’t
changed since 1985 but are expected to respond to a phenomenon that didn’t

1

Benjamin Disraeli, Endymion, (Project Gutenberg, 2006), Chapter LXXXII, online:
<http://www.gutenberg.org/files/7926/7926-h/7926-h.htm>.

2

Brian Pempus, “Global Gambling Market To Reach $635 Billion By 2022, New Research Says” (27
September 2016), online: <http://www.cardplayer.com/poker-news/20865-global-gambling-market-toreach-635-billion-by-2022>.

3

“Global Online Gambling Market Worth USD 66.59 Billion by 2020”, Business Wire (6 October 2016),
online: <https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20161006005678/en/Global-Online-GamblingMarket-Worth-USD-66.59>.
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even exist in the 1980s. The current gambling provisions do not sufficiently
address the harms of online gambling; they are not tailored to the new and
emerging problems that are caused by instant communication across the internet.
This paper examines the origins and history of the gambling provisions in the
Criminal Code4, and reviews their development over time and through case law.
Next, the paper establishes how the Criminal Code applies to bets made over the
internet. It analyzes the legal issues around the Kahnawake Gaming Commission,
an extension of a First Nation’s claim to sovereignty and the most prolific online
gambling regulator in the world. The paper concludes with ideas about the next
steps in gaming regulation in Canada, suggesting the federal government regain
control over online gaming.

Though the biggest new development in gambling law is the availability of
online gaming, it is important to establish the framework under which the Criminal
Code deals with gambling at large. Unlike the United States, who have the Unlawful
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act,5 Canada does not use a separate legal framework
for addressing internet gambling specifically.6 The Criminal Code sorts gambling
provisions into the section on ‘Disorderly Houses, Gaming and Betting’, making
clearer the original moral aspects of gambling laws.7 Section 201 of the Criminal
Code prohibits common gaming houses and common betting houses, as locations
where for-profit gambling occurs.8 Section 202 prohibits a number of activities
related to for-profit gambling, including pool-selling, registering or recording
bets, publishing odds or other betting information, or keeping any device used
for gambling or betting.9 None of these prohibitions apply to bets between
private individuals who are “not engaged in any way in the business of betting”,
4

Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 [Criminal Code].

5

Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 USC §§ 5361-5366 (2006).

6

Jamie Strashin, “Online sports betting ignored by Canadian government while US acts”, CBC Sports (4 May
2016), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/sports/sports-gambling-canada-united-states-regulation-1.3565832>.

7

Criminal Code, supra note 4 at Part VII, ss 197–213.

8

Ibid, s 201.

9

Ibid, s 202.
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A strange element to this framework is the separation between the ‘lottery
schemes’ in section 206, and the prohibitions in section 202, which are aimed
primarily at bookkeeping and sports betting. Section 206 prohibits a diverse range
of gambling behaviour, all of which is labelled a ‘lottery scheme’. The broad scope
of these provisions is demonstrated by the length and complexity of some of
these provisions. For example, section 206(1)(e) prohibits any “scheme,
contrivance or operation” where players stake current or future payment of
money or other valuable security in exchange for the chance to win a greater sum,
because other players have contributed (or will contribute) money or valuable
security.12 The nature of a wager or bet is difficult to identify, and the incredibly
broad language in section 206 is a testament to that challenge. Section 207 allows
lotteries operated or licensed by provincial governments, keeping in mind that
the definition of ‘lottery’ includes almost everything prohibited by sections
206(1)(a) through 206(1)(g), and therefore allows the provinces to conduct and
manage almost any gaming operation, or authorize another body to do so.13 One
of the few differences with online and electronic gaming is that provinces cannot
license other organizations to conduct or manage lotteries conducted “on or
through a computer, video device or slot machine”; these types of games must
be operated by the province directly.14

Compared to other jurisdictions, Canada’s criminal framework for gambling
is relatively permissive. Betting is allowed so long as the players are the only ones
10

Ibid, s 204(1)(b).

11

Ibid, ss 204(1)(c), 204(5–11).

12

Ibid, s 206(1)(e).

13

Ibid, ss 206(1)(a)–206(1)(g).

14

Ibid, s 207(4)(c).
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prohibiting for-profit betting only.10 Section 204 contains other important
exemptions that apply to horse racing, delegating significant regulatory powers to
the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food in controlling gambling on horse
races.11

5

who win and lose, and the Criminal Code even makes specific exceptions to allow
for horse racing and provincial lotteries.15 Canadian criminal law was not always
so tolerant of gambling. With the codification of Canadian criminal law in 1892,
the Criminal Code adopted already-existing legislative bans on gambling.16 Horserace betting was the first licensed and regulated form of gambling in Canada, with
a criminal code exemption in place since 1910. This exemption was suspended
for a brief period between 1917 and 1920 because gambling was considered
wasteful and “incommensurate with the war effort.”17 Horse races are regulated
by the federal Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food, who licenses racetrack
operators to run races and collect bets.18 The gambling around horse tracks
supports the husbandry and racing industries – racing and betting have always
gone together. Critics of this early gaming exemption ran up against stiff
opposition from courts and governments who saw gambling as a necessary evil
to support “a pastime and business of much importance”.19 As Chief Justice
Meredith of the Ontario Court of Appeal so succinctly put it, “no betting no
racing; a killing of two birds with one stone.”20 For several decades, horse racing
was the only legal betting allowed by the Criminal Code, but more ‘business of
much importance’ was soon to follow.
Legalized lotteries are a much more recent development, occurring in the
late 20th century. Their introduction came with the same Criminal Code reforms
that legalized abortion and same-sex sexual activity, diminishing the influence of
moral regulation on criminal law.21 From 1969 onwards, the federal government
used lotteries primarily for financing large national events such as the Olympics
in Montreal (1976) and Calgary (1988).22 The provinces resented federal
involvement in the lottery business, and lobbied for exclusive control of gaming
15

Ibid, ss 204(1)(c), 207.

16

Colin S Campbell, Timothy F Hartnagel & Garry J Smith, The Legalization of Gambling in Canada (July 2005) at
13, online: <http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2008/lcc-cdc/JL2-64-2005E.pdf>.

17

Ibid at 14 (Table 1).

18

Criminal Code, supra note 4, s 204(1)(c)(i).

19

Re Racetracks and Betting (1921), 36 CCC 357 at para 5, 61 DLR 504.

20

Ibid at para 2.

21

Campbell, Hartnagel & Smith, supra note 16 at 14.

22

Ibid at 15–17.
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and the revenues that it brought to governments.23 In 1985, the federal
government agreed to amend the Criminal Code to allow only the provincial
governments to conduct and manage lotteries. This concession was made in
exchange for a cash payment of $100 million towards the Calgary Olympics, and
annual payments of $24 million (indexed to inflation) from provincial lottery
revenues.24 Gambling had now become a significant revenue generator for both
federal and provincial governments. The lottery deal was netting the federal
government $60 million annually by 2003.25 Critics and cynics pointed out the
“dubious morality of elected representatives decriminalizing otherwise criminal
behaviour for cash payments.”26 They saw the federal government abandoning
the morality-based approach to gambling regulation, appearing to replace it with
nothing but bare pragmatism.
These criticisms were compounded by the fact that the deal was approved
by Parliament with minimal public consultation, and a debate that lasted less than
3 hours. From second reading on November 6, 1985 to royal assent on December
20 of the same year, no amendments were made, and many felt that it had been
“rubber-stamped” by Parliament.27 Debates around the bill were led not by the
Minister of Justice and Justice critics, but by Ministers and critics for fitness and
sport.28 The Progressive-Conservative government heralded the bill as a way to
lock in provincial support for the Olympics (in the form of an immediate $100
million payment). The Honourable Otto Jelinek said that Bill C-81 “gives a clear
legislative recognition to past and present provincial activities” and “sets some
realistic and clear standards on what is permissible.” The key for the government
was the elimination of an irritant in federal-provincial relations, and defining the
scope of what gaming activities the provinces could undertake.29 The Opposition
23

Ibid at 16-17.

24

Ibid at 17.

25

Ibid.

26

Timothy IW Patrick, “No Dice: Violations of the Criminal Code’s Gaming Exemptions by Provincial
Governments” (2000) 44:1 Crim LQ 108 at 11.

27

Campbell, Hartnagel & Smith, supra note 16 at 17–18.

28

“Bill C-81, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (lotteries)”, 2nd reading, House of Commons Debates, 33rd
Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 6 (6 November 1985) at 8416-8417 (Hon Otto Jelinek) [“Bill C-81”].

29

Ibid.
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criticized the Bill for removing funding for Canada’s national sports teams (which
were previously funded by federal sports pools and lotteries).30 The NDP critic
was adamant that gambling should not be supported or condoned by the
government, because of the “social and moral consequences” that go along with
it. Mr. Epps called Bill C-81 “a Bill that is only to be supported because of its
half-way nature”, and called on the government to eventually remove the
government-operated lottery exemptions from the Criminal Code.31 The NDP
critic seemed to be the only one who maintained a moral opposition to gambling,
whereas the members of the government and official opposition were much more
concerned about improving the relationship with the provinces and using
gambling revenues to fund other federal activities.
Despite Minister Jelinek’s assurance that Bill C-81 would “not promote an
expansion of gambling”, the 1985 amendments led to a significant growth in both
lottery ticket sales and casino gambling. By 2003, government-operated lotteries,
bingo, electronic gaming machines (EGMs or, more commonly “video lottery
terminals” – VLTs), and casinos brought in $12 billion of revenue across
Canada.32 By clarifying the boundaries of acceptable conduct for the provinces,
Bill C-81 facilitated this expansion. In addition, the Criminal Code continued to
prohibit any for-profit gambling conducted by non-provincial entities. This
political deal gave the provinces a monopoly on gaming, supported by criminal
sanctions. In a paper presented to the Law Commission of Canada, Campbell,
Hartnagel & Smith conclude that “Canadian criminal law has been used to
consolidate provincial authority over gambling as a revenue raising instrument
and to expand its availability rather than restrict it in any meaningful sense.”33
Patrick agrees, calling the creation of a provincial monopoly “a peculiar use of
the criminal law power.”34 This peculiar use remains the status quo to this day, as
the provinces continue to be the only authorized managers and conductors of
lottery and gaming operations in Canada.
30

Ibid at 8417-8418 (Hon Sergio Marchi).

31

Ibid at 8420 (Hon Ernie Epps).

32

Campbell, Hartnagel & Smith, supra note 16 at 20.

33

Ibid at 7-8.

34

Patrick, supra note 26 at 108.
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This delegation of gambling regulation to the provinces has been challenged
unsuccessfully in the courts. In R v Furtney,35 the accused were managers of a
charity lottery who were alleged to have breached conditions of their provincial
license, and therefore liable under the Criminal Code section 207(3).36 They argued
that the parts of section 207, under which they were charged, were an improper
delegation of the federal criminal power to the provinces, and that the law was
therefore ultra vires. The Supreme Court agreed that delegation of authority from
one level of government to another is “constitutionally impermissible”37, but the
court found that the delegation in section 207 was not improper. The court held
that section 207 delegated authority to the provincial Lieutenant Governor in
Council, separate from the provincial legislature.38 In addition, section 207 allows
provincial legislation to dictate its scope by referring to provincial laws relating to
the terms and conditions of lottery licenses.39 The Supreme Court held that
gambling could be regulated jointly by the federal and provincial governments,
acting under different heads of power.
The accused in R v Hair40 made similar constitutional arguments that the
criminal elements of gambling had disappeared from the law. They argued – with
evidence from Dr. Garry Smith – that the criminal law was intended to give effect
to the political deal with the provinces and was no longer directed at the
prevention of gambling. If the Criminal Code was not concerned with the moral
and social consequences of gambling, intending instead to protect a provincial
monopoly on gambling, it could be argued that it now lacked a valid criminal law
purpose for legislating on the subject. The applicants in Hair made the argument
that the 1985 amendments demonstrated not only a public shift in morals, but a
shift in Parliament’s intention as well.41 Hair is the most recent case to address
35

R v Furtney, [1991] 3 SCR 89, 129 NR 241, 14 WCB (2d) 35 [Furtney].

36

Criminal Code, supra note 4, s 207(3).

37

Furtney, supra note 35 at para 33.

38

Ibid at para 34.

39

Ibid at para 35.

40

R v Hair, 2016 ONSC 900, 349 CRR (2d) 256 [Hair].

41

Ibid at paras 34–35.
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the constitutionality of the gambling provisions.42 Relying on Furtney and other
appellate-level decisions43, the court held that the criminal provisions relating to
gambling are still valid exercises of federal power. Justice Brown of the Ontario
Superior Court held that there were still significant harms related to unlicensed
gambling and that there had not been a material change in the circumstances or
evidence that would allow the court to revisit this issue already addressed by
appellate courts.44 Justice Brown declined to distinguish the case from Furtney45,
and maintained that the criminal law still validly applied to gambling.
The court in Hair had to address another new development in gambling law
which had arisen since Furtney. In 2001, Parliament passed legislation to stiffen
penalties for organized criminal activity. Bill C-2446 redefined criminal
organizations as any group of three or more people, who have as one of their
main purposes or main activities the commission of one or more serious offences
which will result in a material benefit for the group. The definition of a serious
offence was amended to include any offence with a maximum sentence of five
years or greater, plus any other offences prescribed by regulation.47 In 2010,
Regulation SOR/2010-161 made the crimes in sections 202 and 206 “serious
offences”, opening up bettors and gambling providers to prosecution for
organized crime offences.48 The accused in Hair49 argued that this additional
jeopardy for conduct which was not morally or socially harmful violated their
section 7 Charter rights.50 Justice Brown found that Parliament did not only intend
to target “major players in traditional criminal organizations”51, and that the
42

Ibid.

43

R v Andriopoulos, 1994 CanLII 147 (ONCA), 1994 CarswellOnt 3947; R v Jourdain (2001), 150 OAC
314 (CA), 51 WCB (2d) 283; Siemens v Manitoba, 2003 SCC 3, [2003] 1 SCR 6.

44

Hair, supra note 40 at para 48.

45

Furtney, supra note 35.

46

An Act to amend the Criminal Code (organized crime and law enforcement) and to make consequential amendments to other
Acts, 1st Sess, 37th Parl, 2001 (assented to 18 December 2001), SC 2001, c 32.

47

Criminal Code, supra note 4, s 467.1(1).

48

Regulations Prescribing Certain Offences to be Serious Offences, SOR/2010-161, s 1 [Regulations].

49

Hair, supra note 40.

50

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].

51

Hair, supra note 40 at para 93.
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While Justice Brown’s decisions on these two issues – the scope of the
criminal law power, and whether tying gambling to organized crime breaches
section 7 of the Charter52 – seem consistent with one another, they do still raise
the question: If for-profit gambling is so harmful to society, why does Parliament
allow provinces to conduct and license gambling operations at all? One major
reason is that publicly-operated lotteries and gaming fund the public purse rather
than organized crime. The evidence supports the connection that Justice Brown
saw between unlicensed gambling and criminal organizations. Detective
Inspector Moodie, as head of Ontario’s Illegal Gaming Enforcement Unit, found
that illegal gambling was a major funding source for traditional organized crime,
and that despite the criminal prohibitions, there were “no significant deterrents”
for criminal organizations to operate illegal gambling rings.53 He called gambling
revenues the “foundation upon which most other illicit activities are
supported.”54 Clearly, a policy change was necessary to ensure that criminal
organizations could not profit off of gambling.
Writing as he was before the coming into force of Regulation SOR/2010Detective Inspector Moodie likely would have approved of the additional
deterrents to gambling offences flowing from their inclusion in section 467.56
However, the availability of legal gambling is not enough by itself to prevent
criminal organizations from running gaming rings for profit. In a study of illegal
gambling in Western Canada, the most common forms of illegal gaming were
found to be “ironically, … versions of government-offered gambling formats”
such as unlicensed VLTs, offshore lotteries, and underground card rooms.57 The
authors of the study noted that “illegal gambling formats compete well with their
16155,

52

Charter, supra note 50.

53

LD Moodie, Ontario’s organized crime section—Illegal gambling unit: Its evolution and accomplishments (Paper
presented at the Gambling, Law Enforcement and Justice System Issues conference, University of Alberta,
Edmonton, AB, March 2002) at 7.

54

Ibid.

55

Regulations, supra note 48.

56

Criminal Code, supra note 4, s 467.

57

Campbell, Hartnagel & Smith, supra note 16 at 41.
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inclusion of gambling offences as serious offences captures exactly the kind of
harmful conduct that Parliament intended to be covered by the gambling laws.

11

legal counterparts because they offer more attractive wagering propositions and
services such as credit, better odds, higher stakes, and telephone betting.”58 This
is perhaps the most persuasive reason to maintain criminal prohibitions on
gambling activity. Provinces certainly need to restrict gambling to some extent to
avoid the potential social harms of excess gambling, but overly bureaucratic or
restrictive regulatory frameworks allow organized crime to thrive despite the
existence of legal alternatives. Criminal sanctions may still be necessary to deter
and dismantle criminal organizations who engage in illegal gambling to fund
themselves. Seen in this light, the criminal law does indeed help support the
provincial monopoly over gambling, but it does so at the expense of criminal
enterprise.
If the dismantling of organized crime favours a less restrictive regulatory
framework, the pressure in the other direction is the need to prevent problem
gambling and other related social ills. Provinces may be ‘competing’ with criminal
organizations for revenue, but they are still obligated to prevent harms to their
residents. Coming back to the criticisms raised by Mr. Epps in debates around
Bill C-8159, provinces are effectively condoning gambling behaviour while
benefiting from the revenues. Nova Scotia’s Addictions Services Office notes that
“the very significant revenue derived from gambling activity sets up the potential
for a conflict of interest for governments who must also address the associated
health and social problems.”60 On average, Canadian provinces rely on gambling
income for 3.8% of their own-source revenue.61 In response to this dilemma,
provinces have set up an array of prevention and harm reduction programs for
gambling. Most of these programs have been focused at reducing demand for
gambling. Demand-side efforts are less threatening to the ‘gambling industry’ of
licensees and gaming facilities, and so are politically easy to put in place. Unlike
supply-side restrictions which would directly limit the ability to offer gambling
58

Ibid.

59

“Bill C-81”, supra note 28.

60

Nova Scotia Department of Health Promotion and Protection, Best Advice for Preventing Problem Gambling in
Nova Scotia, by Gary Roberts and Associates (November 2008), online:
<https://novascotia.ca/dhw/addictions/documents/Best-Advice-for-Preventing-Gambling-Problems-inNova-Scotia.pdf> at 26 [Best Advice].

61

Ibid at 4.
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services in and of themselves, demand-based reduction approaches only hurt
revenues if they are effective. Private industry is also benefitting from the
expansion of gambling. VLT operators in Alberta retain 15% of the profits from
each machine, giving the gambling industry a substantial incentive to promote
risky gambling behaviour. The rationale of keeping gambling revenue public “may
be compromised since sizable portions” of the profits that accrue from gaming
are directed to private operators.62 In regulating and restricting gambling,
provinces must not only fight through their own conflict of interest but also the
private incentives to expand gambling revenues.
Though favoured by the gambling industry, demand reduction measures are
less effective at reducing problem gambling than programs aimed at restricting
the availability of gaming or reducing the harms caused by gambling.63 VLTs are
particularly prone to problem gambling, because of the increased pace of play and
the addition of visual and auditory stimuli.64 64% of problem gamblers in Nova
Scotia listed VLTs as the top concern for their gambling behaviour.65 Provinces
have been hesitant to restrict the number of operating VLTs because they have
been a significant revenue generator. Though online gambling may be less
addictive than VLTs, its accessibility and convenience requires careful attention
to prevent problem gambling.66 The easy availability of electronic gambling is a
serious problem for provinces to regulate, and the current state of the criminal
law means the federal government is removed from that regulatory picture. These
moral and social problems are rightly addressed by the criminal law.

Online and electronic gaming have reached their maturity in Canada. The
first online casino opened its virtual doors in 1995. By 2001, there were 250
62

Campbell, Hartnagel & Smith, supra note 16 at 58.

63

Best Advice, supra note 60 at 28.

64

Andrew Nikiforuk, “Alberta’s Gamble with Gambling”, The Walrus (12 November 2006), online:
<https://thewalrus.ca/2006-11-society/>.

65

Best Advice, supra note 60 at 6.

66

Kahlil S Philander & Terri-Lynn MacKay, “Online gambling participation and problem gambling severity: is
there a causal relationship?” (2014) 14:2 International Gambling Studies 214 at 224.
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websites offering gambling online. By 2009, that number had jumped to 2500
sites, operating from 50 different jurisdictions.67 International accounting firm
PwC concludes that while it is clear that the market is gradually “going digital”,
“the pace and scale of the migration to online spending is clearly much more
difficult to call”68 simply because regulation of the market is so fragmented, and
it is difficult to get accurate assessments of underground gambling. Players may
prefer online gaming to land-based casino or VLT gaming for several reasons.
The most common reasons relate to accessibility, convenience, and a preference
for gaming in private rather than in public.69 The development of new online
technologies and the growing ease of financial transactions over the internet
suggest that online gaming will continue to expand in popularity. Surprisingly,
Canadian law has done little to respond to this trend.
A private members’ bill in the late ‘90s attempted to bring the Criminal Code
up to date with respect to online gaming. Bill C-353 (An Act to amend the Criminal
Code (Internet Lotteries)) was introduced in November of 1996 and passed second
reading in February of 1997.70 During the debate, members touted the strong
economic benefits that regulated online gaming could have for Canada. One
member, though opposed to gaming in principle, stated that “Canadians are
already gambling on the Internet and money is leaving the country.”71 The bill
proposed that the federal government jump back into the field to regulate online
gaming. The Bill’s main feature was an amendment to section 207 of the Criminal
Code, which would have expanded the ability of governments (at both the
provincial and federal level) to regulate and operate online gaming services. In
addition to schemes conducted or managed by the provinces, the federal
government would have been able to “conduct and manage a lottery scheme on
the Internet”, “either alone or in conjunction with the government of one or

67

Nova Scotia, Responsible Gaming Strategy 2011, (strategic report), at 6.

68

PwC, Gaming Outlook 2011-2012 at 38.

69

Robert T Wood, Robert J Williams & Paul K Lawton, “Why do Internet gamblers prefer online versus landbased venues? Some preliminary findings and implications” (2007) 20 Journal of Gambling Issues 235 at 239.

70

Bill C-353, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (Internet lotteries), 2nd Sess, 35th Parl, 1997 [Bill C-353].

71

“Bill C-353, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (Internet lotteries)”, House of Commons Debates, 35th Parl, 2nd
Sess, No 129 (13 February 1997) at 8115 (Hon Werner Schmidt).
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more provinces”.72 The sponsor of the bill, the Honourable Dennis Mills,
addressed the issue of the 1985 lottery deal, and its inability to respond to the
internet age: “When the whole use of the Internet is exploding in front of our
very faces, there was never ever any discussion back in 1979 or 1985 whether or
not this was going to be a serious issue.”73 Mr. Mills urged the federal government
to be proactive in regulating online gaming, rather than waiting for the provinces
to act on their own. The Parliamentary Secretary for International Trade opined
that it was high time for the federal government to debate and decide “whether
it wants to be in the business [of online gambling] and if it is in the business how
it relates to the provincial governments and the previous agreements on lotteries
that were made a few years ago.”74 Despite these efforts to modernize Canada’s
gaming legislation, the bill died on the order paper when Parliament was dissolved
in April of 1997, and online gaming continued to be prohibited except where
conducted and managed by the provinces under section 207.
As we’ve already seen, the Criminal Code provisions on gambling prevent
Canadian companies from operating online gaming services.75 The Starnet case is
one of the only prosecutions in Canada that applies these prohibitions to online
gambling.76 Starnet Communications Inc. was a company headquartered in
Delaware, which operated pornographic websites and online casinos. This latter
business attracted the attention of Canadian organized crime investigators.
Starnet kept servers in Vancouver through which gamblers would download
software for playing online games. This software would route the gambler’s
connection through the Vancouver servers to other systems in Antigua.77 In 2001,
Starnet was charged under section 202(1)(b) of the Criminal Code78 for keeping a
device used for gambling – the device being the computers and computer
networks located at their Vancouver offices. Starnet pleaded guilty, receiving a
72

Bill C-353, supra note 70, s 1.

73

Bill C-353 Debates, supra note 71 at 8112 (Hon Dennis J Mills).

74

Ibid at 8116 (Hon Ron MacDonald).

75

Re Earth Future Lottery, 2002 PESCAD 8, aff’d 2003 SCC 10, 215 DLR (4th) 656 [Earth Future]. This case is
discussed further at pp 2-3 and 17.

76

R v Starnet Communications International Inc, 2001 CarswellBC 3525 (BC Prov Court) [Starnet].
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fine of $100,000, and forfeiting $3.925 million US in profits.79 For this charge, it
was irrelevant that only a small portion of the gamblers who accessed Starnet’s
gaming services were Canadians – though it warranted mention by Starnet’s
defense attorney, who likely wanted to diminish the impact that Starnet’s activities
might have had in Canada. What’s clear though is that the elements of section
202(1)(b)80 would have been met even without participation by Canadian
gamblers. The keeping of the device is the crime, regardless of the location from
which bets are placed.
Territoriality poses an interesting problem for online gaming, as for other
offences committed over the internet. Would Starnet still have been prosecuted
in Canada had their servers been located offshore? Most online gaming would
violate section 206(1)(e), which is broad enough to cover any situation where a
player stakes money in exchange for the chance to be owed a greater sum of
money.81 Online casinos may fall afoul of section 202(1)(d), which prohibits
recording or registering bets.82 Even if the server is located outside of Canada,
the Ontario Court of Appeal (upheld by the Supreme Court) has held that bets
are agreements between two people, requiring both offer and acceptance, each of
which may occur in a different location.83 Certainly foreign operators pose
problems for enforcement, particularly where the companies have no assets or
physical presence in Canada. Courts will likely not entertain a criminal charge
against a person not present in Canada. However, the Supreme Court’s decision
in SOCAN opens the door to prosecution based solely on the reception of an
internet transmission in Canada.84 The question remains unanswered, but
prosecution is certainly possible. Canadians and Canadian companies could be
subject to several charges for facilitating this criminal activity. These foreign
gambling operators could easily fall into the definition of a criminal organization
in section 467.1(1), which specifically includes persons inside or outside of
79
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Canada committing serious offences.85 Recalling that SOR/2010-161 made
section 202 a serious offense, facilitating or receiving a gaming transaction could
result in criminal liability. Financial institutions and server hosts are among those
most at risk of being hit with these charges.86 Companies that host gaming servers
are critical to the transmission of data itself, while financial institutions could be
violating section 202(1)(c), which prohibits holding money or property relating to
any transaction prohibited by section 202.87 Though no Canadian company has
ever been charged for facilitating online gaming, the provisions could easily and
reasonably be interpreted to include foreign operators offering bets to Canadians.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Earth Future supports the interpretation that
a lottery may take place in more than one place at once using telecommunications,
opening the operator to criminal liability.88 The court was asked to determine the
validity of a license granted to a charity lottery that proposed selling lottery tickets
by telephone and over the internet on a global scale. The Supreme Court upheld
the decision of the PEI Supreme Court Appeal Division that the lottery license
was invalid and in breach of the Criminal Code. The Attorney General of Prince
Edward Island argued that since the servers and infrastructure were all located on
the island, the lottery was conducted and managed there. In addition, the rules
and regulations of the lottery included a provision that deemed any transactions
to have taken place in PEI. The court drew a distinction between a lottery
conducted from a province and lotteries conducted in the province.89 They also
found that the deeming provision – while it may be determinative for private
contract disputes – had no effect on changing the location of the actus reus of a
criminal offence.90 By attempting to conduct the lottery partially outside the
province, the Earth Fund would have contravened the offence in section 207(3)
of conducting a lottery scheme outside of the scope of provincial authorization.91
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The Court added that even if it had found that the lottery was conducted
entirely in PEI, the types of scheme that provinces can license are restricted by
section 207(4)(c).92 Provinces cannot license other bodies to conduct and manage
lotteries “operated on or through a computer”.93 This means that online gaming
and online lottery sales are the exclusive domain of the provinces. Charitable
lotteries and casinos cannot offer digital or online gaming without breaching
section 207(3).94 Section 207(4)(c)95 permits only lotteries that comply with
section 207(1)(a) (schemes conducted and managed by the province, or by several
provinces, only operating in those provinces).96

Interprovincial agreements for online lotteries are still possible but are made
more difficult because they cannot license another body to manage the lottery
(the process allowed by section 207(1)(f) of the Criminal Code).97 The Western
Canada Lottery Corporation (WCLC) and Atlantic Lottery Corporation (ALC)
are creatures of interprovincial agreement and are owned by their constituting
governments98. These crown corporations are part of government and meet the
requirements of section 207(1)(a) of the Criminal Code,99 at least according to the
provinces that make them up.100 Their validity has not been challenged in court.
The Interprovincial Lottery Corporation (ILC), on the other hand, is owned by
each of the provincial and interprovincial lottery corporations (BC Lottery
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After Earth Future,102 PEI made another attempt to create a lottery that
would have extra-provincial reach. The government of PEI was concerned that
unregulated online gambling was undermining their gaming revenues, but the
government couldn’t compete by offering their own e-gaming platform. PEI is
too small to make online gaming viable in that province alone, so the province
went looking for other opportunities to reach a larger market.103 In 2008, the
provincial government pursued two options for making PEI an online gaming
hub: Plan A was an interprovincial agreement that would provide other provinces
a share of the revenue from the gaming site in exchange for access to their
markets, and Plan B was to host the servers for the gaming platform on the
Abegweit First Nation reserve, to make prosecution under the Criminal Code less
likely. The province loaned $950,000 to the Mi’kmaq Confederacy of PEI
(MCPEI) to research Plan B and began work to bring other provinces aboard.104
To operate the gaming hub, the province linked up with Capital Markets
Technologies (CMT), a tech company with access to a platform for secure and
rapid financial transactions. CMT’s expertise and its ability to create financial
infrastructure was critical to the plan. A gaming website that cannot securely take
deposits from players or transfer winnings is failing in its primary product. This
partnership between the provincial government, MCPEI, and CMT was
supposed to be a Plan B to deal with the uncertainty of an interprovincial
agreement. In the end, the partnership would not long outlast Plan A.
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Four years later, the province pulled out of their partnerships with MCPEI
and with CMT. They decided that an interprovincial agreement on e-gaming was
“unrealistic”, and the MCPEI plan was “too legally thorny to proceed.”105 Among
the investors for CMT were government officials, including some officials
involved in the project. CMT was later investigated by the PEI securities
commission, and negative rumours whipped through the province, prompting
many investors to pull out. PEI’s brief and unsuccessful foray into online
gambling ended in political disaster, with taxpayers left on the hook for the
$950,000 spent on the e-gaming report, and with no financial or gaming hub to
show for it.

On its face, it seems like the idea of avoiding criminal liability by operating
out of a First Nations reserve should have taken far less than four years to be
dismissed as “legally thorny”, but the provincial government and MCPEI were
drawing inspiration from the pre-existing success of the Mohawk Territory of
Kahnawake, an Indian reserve located just south of Montreal. Kahnawake has a
strong tradition of independence and autonomy. They employ their own police
force of ‘Peacekeepers’, and as part of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy (also
known as the Iroquois League of Nations), issue their own passports and
identification documents to their members. Kahnawake is governed by a band
council, recognized and regulated under the Indian Act.106 In the late 1990s, the
band council devised a plan to both promote economic development on their
territory, and to protect their community from gaming activity that took place
there.107 In allowing (and regulating) gambling, Kahnawake claims an exemption
from the criminal gambling prohibitions based on their inherent right to selfgovernment, and a more specific Aboriginal right that stems from the centrality
of gaming and wagers to Mohawk culture.
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Many First Nations in Canada and the United States have entered into
agreements with provincial and state authorities to gain access to gambling
revenues and to regulate gambling on their territories. Kahnawake took a
different approach, forming its own gambling regulator – the Kahnawake
Gaming Commission (KGC) – which is unconnected to the Quebec
government’s licensing body. The KGC was created by the Kahnawake Gaming
Law108, a by-law passed by the band council. In addition to traditional land-based
gaming, the KGC licenses two types of interactive gambling activity. The first
license type is an “interactive gaming license” or IGL. This license allows the
holder to develop and maintain infrastructure which is used by service providers
to host gaming content. To date, the only holder of an IGL is Mohawk Internet
Technologies (MIT) – a band-owned corporation that remits its profits to the
Mohawk Council of Kahnawake. The service providers must secure a “client
provider authorization” from the gaming commission (a “CPA” – the second
type of gambling license) and can then contract with MIT to host their content
online. As of 2008, 65 different license-holders were operating 470 websites
regulated by the KGC.109 This amounted to more than 60% of internet gaming
traffic across the entire globe.110 Kahnawake bills itself as a globally-recognized
regulator of online gaming and has a substantial foothold in the online gaming
industry.
The licensing scheme under the Kahnawake Gaming Law was challenged in
court in Horne v Kahnawake Gaming Commission.111 Horne applied to the KGC for
an IGL license but was denied. Section 28 of the Kahnawake Gaming Law allows
the KGC to deny applications “on purely policy grounds” even when the other
criteria for licensing are met.112 The applicant challenged the validity of section
28 and claimed that the KGC should have granted him a license. He also asserted
108
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that the KGC was under inappropriate political pressure from the Council to
deny his application. The KGC argued that they had concerns from the beginning
about issuing a second IGL in addition to that issued to MIT – a band-owned
corporation. They had made the decision to deny the license, and only then did
they seek direction from Council on future IGL applications. The court upheld
the commission’s decision, finding that “the community’s interest prevailed as
required by [the gaming commission’s] constituting law.”113 Neither side argued
that the law was ultra vires the band council, and the Court appeared content to
decide the case based on the provisions of the statute itself. Though this was not
a decision in a criminal context, the court recognized the validity of the gaming
law as a whole.
The biggest question about the Kahnawake Gaming Law remains unanswered:
does Kahnawake maintain an Aboriginal right to gamble under section 35(1) of
the Constitution Act, 1982?114 If they do, the criminal laws relating to gambling
would not apply to the Kahnawake Mohawks, significantly changing the nature
of the conversation around gambling regulation in Canada. Of all the licenseholders under the KGC, only one has ever been prosecuted on gambling charges.
Cyber World Group – the owner of worldwide cyber-casino GoldenPalace.com
– pleaded guilty in a Quebec court in 2007. The terms of that guilty plea are not
publicly available, but it was reported that Cyber World Group paid a $2 million
fine and relocated their business out of the Montreal area.115 It is also unclear
which gambling offence Cyber World Group was charged with. Though they had
offices in Montreal, they were merely leasing servers from Mohawk Internet
Technologies, so it is unlikely they were charged under section 202 of the Criminal
Code116 for keeping a gaming device (as they weren’t ‘keeping’ the device
themselves). At any rate, both Cyber World Group and the Crown prosecutors
must have felt the uncertainty of their respective positions, agreeing to a hefty
fine rather than risking jail time or an acquittal. The trial would have been massive,
requiring not only proof of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, but there also
113
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would have been a significant sub-trial about Kahnawake’s right to regulate
gambling on their territory. If the Kahnawake Gaming Law stems from an
Aboriginal right, Cyber World Group and other licensees are protected from
prosecution through the by-law’s authorization. Commentators at the time said
that this guilty plea raised doubts about the Mohawks’ legal authority for licensing
gambling,117 but no other prosecutions have occurred since 2007. The question
therefore remains unanswered, but the Kahnawake Mohawk continue to regulate
gambling on their territory without interference or protest from the Federal
government.
If Kahnawake were to claim in court that they have an Aboriginal right to
control gambling, the biggest hurdle for them to overcome is the Supreme Court
of Canada case of R v Pamajewon.118 In applying the framework from Van der
Peet,119 the court found that gambling was not central to the Anishinaabe of
Northern Ontario prior to contact with Europeans.120 However, this case is not
determinative of the Mohawks’ Aboriginal rights claim. Section 35(1)121 claims
are highly contextual and fact-specific, and there are huge differences in culture
and history between the Anishinaabe and the Mohawk, which could result in a
different factual finding. To be designated as an Aboriginal right, it would have
to be proven that gambling is an “integral part” of the Mohawks’ “distinctive
culture”.
The court in Pamajewon highlighted the ruling of the Ontario Court of
Appeal, which held that “there is no evidence that gambling on the reserve lands
generally was ever the subject matter of Aboriginal regulation. Moreover, there
is no evidence of an historic involvement in anything resembling the high-stake
gambling in issue in these cases.”122 Among the Iroquois peoples, including the
Mohawk, there was a strong tradition of high stakes betting, particularly on
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lacrosse games. One historian recounted how an Iroquois lacrosse spectator
would stake “almost every valuable article which he possessed” on the outcome
of a game.123 Betting was not only integral to pre-contact Mohawk culture, but
was the subject of formalized regulation and governance by the Iroquois.
Complex rituals and codes of conduct were enforced on the games and the
betting, and wagers were woven into the structures of governance themselves.
The use of lacrosse in conflict resolution stems from the Great Law of Peace –
the constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy. The Great Law of Peace mandates
that conflicts between nations are resolved non-violently, with each side ‘betting’
that they will win.124 It is quite likely that these factors would support the
Kahnawake’s exercise of sovereignty over gaming regulation on their territory.
The Kahnawake believe that the KGL falls within their Aboriginal rights.
Murray Marshall, legal counsel for the KGC and the Mohawk Council of
Kahnawake, argues that:
Kahnawake’s jurisdiction to conduct, facilitate and regulate
gaming and gaming related activities is a facet of the right it has
as a community of indigenous peoples to regulate and control
economic development activities that take place within or from
its territory and, more fundamentally, to govern its own
affairs.125
The Mohawk Territory of Kahnawake is taking a proactive approach to
gaming regulation, but are still coordinating with federal, provincial, and foreign
authorities when necessary. In fact, the Kahnawake view this type of coordination
as supportive of their claims to sovereignty. Interwoven in a federal structure,
Kahnawake is one among several constitutional actors. Murray Marshall describes
the efforts undertaken by Kahnawake with the goal of “harmonizing the
legislative provisions of each of the affected jurisdictions”.126 In the wake of the
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2007 Cyber World Group prosecution, one member of the Mohawk Council of
Kahnawake said, of their attitude towards federal and provincial governments:
“We don’t ask for anything…We tell them that this is our right to do this. And
we’re doing it properly, we’re administering it properly—the world seems to think
that we’re doing a good job, and we’re confident we’ll continue to do a good
job.”127 Regarding the jurisdiction and authority of the KGC, that council
member said “Kahnawake is well-respected. Its jurisdiction is unquestioned. The
only place where there is a question is in [our] backyard.”128 Recently, the KGC
entered into an agreement with the New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement
that any online casinos hosted or regulated by the KGC would refuse to serve US
customers unless those content providers were properly licensed in the United
States as well. The Chief of the Kahnawake Territory called the agreement “a
recognition of [the KGC’s] status as a global online gaming regulator and the
future opportunities that status could bring.”129
Whether or not Kahnawake has the authority to do what they are doing,
there is de facto recognition both in Canada and around the world that even if the
KGC is not a fully legitimate regulator130, they are an effective one. Hundreds of
gaming websites are hosted from Kahnawake, and hundreds more are accessible
from places like Malta, Antigua, and the Isle of Man. While provinces can create
their own online casinos, Kahnawake has demonstrated that there is significant
revenue to be made from privatized gambling, and free market access to gambling
sites is now the norm in Canada.
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There is evidence that organized crime groups were using servers in
Kahnawake to host their own gambling content.131 As a gray-market entity with
limited resources, the KGC is not well-situated to do full background checks on
all its content providers. The half-measure of delegating responsibility to the
provinces has not been effective either. Harm reduction efforts funded by
provincial revenues are undercut by the existence of non-provincial gaming sites.
Demand reduction depends on gambling revenues to support gambling
education and information, and these unlicensed sites—even those regulated by
the KGC—are not required to incorporate provincial messaging on their
websites. Supply reduction is ineffective when gamblers can easily access
alternatives online. Reducing provincial gambling revenues is only worth doing if
the result is a net loss to the gambling sector, not if the profits are funneled to
private industry. The result of the current prohibitions and exemptions does not
give governments the tools to effectively compete with the private sector (leaving
profits on the table) but are still ineffective in curbing problem gambling.
A national regulatory framework is needed to create online casinos which
are viable, entertaining, and safe for consumers. Whether that framework
incorporates the Kahnawake Territory or allows it to continue to operate on its
own, the federal government must choose either liberalization or prohibition: it
can’t have both without a unified regulatory regime. Individual provinces have
not been willing to cooperate on online gaming to any great extent. Apart from
the Atlantic Lottery Corporation’s online offerings (which are accessible from any
Atlantic province), each province that hosts online gambling does so on its
own.132 Each provincial government has different policy goals and different
gaming infrastructure. Would-be bettors can only access government-sponsored
online gaming in their own province because of the restrictive wording of section
131
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207(1)(a).133 The result is a patchwork of content and, more importantly, a
patchwork of regulatory structures and harm reduction efforts. If it’s worth
preventing Canadians from accessing gaming services from other provinces, it’s
worth preventing Canadians from accessing foreign products too. The current
approach has too many internal conflicts and contradictions to be an effective
framework for gambling regulation. The 1985 amendments134, while effective in
increasing gambling revenue, also promoted an expansion in gambling which will
not be possible to contain. Canadians accept that gambling is a legitimate source
of entertainment, and that demand for gambling is not likely to subside, even with
stricter regulations. What is needed is a national regulator like that proposed by
Dennis Mills in 1996, with the introduction of Bill C-353.135 Provinces can
provide their input and contribute their significant gaming expertise, while
Federal regulation will provide a unified and consistent framework across the
country. This would achieve the best of both worlds: a casino run by the
government, with revenues returned to the public, and a broad platform reaching
a huge market for demand reduction and gambling control efforts. All the
jurisdictional cards are already on the table. The federal government just needs to
ante up and play the strong hand they’ve been dealt.
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